Summary:
Marja Jalava, On the Question of Social Coherence in the Moral Philosophy of Rolf Lagerborg
It is hardly an overstatement
to claim that since the late 18th century, European scholars have been
obsessed with the conception of modernity and the question of how
modern societies could maintain their coherence. As stated by Friedrich
von Schiller in his classic Über die ästhetische Erziehung
des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen (1795), the advanced culture
had inflicted a wound upon modern man, causing fragmentary
specialization of human powers so that not only had the division of
labor distanced the abstract thinker from the man of practical affairs,
but the inner unity of human nature was severed, too. When egotism and
one-sidedness formed the basis of the modern system, people were
incapable of acquiring “a heart that is truly sociable” and
thus, they suffered all contagions and afflictions of society. For
Schiller, as for many of his contemporaries and followers, the answer
was to be found in the reconciliation of the individual and society on
a higher level, on which opposites, such as sensuality and rationality,
subject and object, and private and public were merged into one in a
qualitatively new kind of unity.
This article deals with the
Finnish discussion on social coherence and national unity at the turn
of the 20th century, with special emphasis on Rolf Lagerborg’s
(1874–1959) sociological moral philosophy. While the Finnish
intellectual milieu was dominated, on the one hand, by the legacy of
German Idealism and, on the other hand, by the Anglo-Saxon empiricism
of the Westermarckian school, the French-orientated moral philosopher
Rolf Lagerborg was a rare bird. Broadly speaking, his conception of the
world was firmly rooted in the liberal, anti-clerical, and
anti-metaphysical ideas of the radical French Revolution. In Finnish
intellectual life, he was a well-known and controversial figure, who
often managed to arouse public anger by way of his sharp-worded,
deliberately provocative opinions. In his case, it was impossible to
distinguish scholarly ideas from extra-scientific interests, since for
him, a philosopher was essentially a public figure taking part in
topical issues, not an isolated academic in his/her ivory tower.